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3Abstract: This paper analyzes a lawsuit ﬁled against McDonald’s by plaintiﬀs alleging that the restaurant
chain bore liability for their obesity and health problems. The paper analyzes the plaintiﬀs’ novel tort and
statutory consumer fraud claims, as well as their evolution through two rounds at the district court and
one round at the appellate court level. Aside from tracking the development of the plaintiﬀs’ various
claims, this paper also examines why the plaintiﬀs abandoned their tort claims and relied exclusively on
their consumer fraud claims. In the concluding sections, the beneﬁts and drawbacks of such an approach
are evaluated and the necessary elements of a future viable claim are outlined. Finally, I oﬀer an
assessment of the plaintiﬀs chances in their currently pending remand before the district court.
I.
Introduction.
“The United States is experiencing substantial increases in overweight and obesity that cut
across ages, racial and ethnic groups, and both genders, has been increasing in every State in
the Nation [and] has reached epidemic proportions...left unabated, overweight and obesity
may soon cause as much preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking.”1
The above is from the Surgeon General’s Call To Action To Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity
in 2001. Interestingly, this country’s ﬁrst obesity lawsuits against the fast food industry began by citing
this dire warning.2 Generally speaking, these novel suits allege that fast food restaurants bear liability for
their customers’ obesity and related health problems. This campaign against the fast food industry oﬃcially
began on July 24, 2002, with the ﬁling of a suit on behalf of Caesar Barber, a then obese ﬁfty-six year-old
2Id; See also Caesar Barber Complaint at 4 (subsequently voluntarily withdrawn) (available at
news.ﬁndlaw.com/hdocs/docs/McDonald’s/barbermcds72302cmp.pdf).
4man, against McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s”), Burger King Corporation, Kentucky Fried Chicken
Corporation, and Wendy’s International, Inc. In his complaint, ﬁled by Samuel Hirsch, a New York based
attorney, Mr. Barber claimed that these four fast food restaurant chains bore liability for his obesity and
other health problems.3 This suit was quickly withdrawn as Mr. Hirsch pursued a near identical suit on
behalf of a larger set of plaintiﬀs.
A.
Pelman v. McDonald’s: Factual and Procedural History.
The second suit, Pelman v. McDonald’s, was ﬁled on August 22, 2002, on behalf of two obese teenagers and
their parents. This case was removed to federal district court, where the judge, Judge Sweet, ﬁrst dismissed
the suit with leave to amend on January 22, 2003.4 On September 3, 2003, the district court dismissed the
suit again – this time with prejudice and without leave to amend. On January 25, 2005, the Second Circuit
issued an opinion vacating part of the district court’s dismissal and remanding the case back to the district
court for a third time. The case’s ﬁnal disposition is unsettled to date.
This paper will analyze the various claims and theories asserted by the Pelman plaintiﬀs in an attempt to
ﬁnd a viable legal claim against McDonald’s. Because of the novelty and uniqueness of this suit, the plaintiﬀs
began their suit with a blunderbuss of arguments, hoping one or more of their theories would result in an
actionable legal wrong. At the core of their claims, however, is a simple allegation: McDonald’s bears liability
3Caesar Barber Complaint at 10 – 13.
4Pelman v. McDonald’s, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)(hereinafter “Pelman I”)
5for selling products that contributed to their adverse health conditions. This simple assertion, however, must
be given form in some cognizable legal principle, be it common law tort, an implied contractual relationship,
or a consumer fraud statutory basis.
Through three rounds of court decisions, two at the district court and one at the appellate court level, the
plaintiﬀs’ litany of arguments have been whittled down to a single consumer fraud claim. In Part II of this
paper I will analyze the plaintiﬀs’ original host of claims, the theories underlying these claims, and McDon-
ald’s defenses. In Part III, I will focus on the court’s treatment of these diﬀerent theories and the parties’
respective claims. In Part IV, I will examine the plaintiﬀs’ second attempt before the district court, the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of the claims they pursued, as well as McDonald’s responses to these modiﬁed
claims. Part V analyzes the district court’s second opinion, which ultimately dismisses the plaintiﬀs’ claims
with prejudice. In Part VI, I discuss the Second Circuit’s recent reinstatement of this case, its bases for
reversal, and the current issues left unresolved. Finally, in Part VII, I conclude by outlining the evolution of
the plaintiﬀs’ original suit, what they must allege going forward, and the remaining obstacles to any recovery.
B.
Preliminary Note: Diﬀerences Between the Pelman and Barber Suits.
Before beginning an in depth examination of the Pelman v. McDonald’s case, a short explanatory note of
the diﬀerences between this case and the withdrawn Barber lawsuit is in order. In pursuing the Pelman suit
6instead of the Barber suit, the attorney for both these suits gained several tactical and legal advantages.5
First, the Pelman suit names two sets of plaintiﬀs, minors and their adult parents. Unlike the earlier suit,
the Pelman case includes minors, which provides clear legal and factual beneﬁts. For example, as discussed
below, a statute of limitations that impedes an adult’s claim is tolled if a minor brings the same claim.
Additionally, minors are better able to rebut McDonald’s assumption of the risk or common knowledge
defenses. Finally, were this case to ever proceed before a jury, minors might make a more favorable set of
plaintiﬀs.
There is another notable discrepancy between the short-lived Barber suit and this suit. In the former, Mr.
Barber alleged that four large restaurant chains were responsible for his obesity and other health problems.
In this suit, the plaintiﬀs only sue McDonald’s. At ﬁrst, one might assume the Pelman plaintiﬀs only
regularly ate at McDonald’s and could not sue the other fast food chains. In fact, however, McDonald’s
noted in its defense briefs that the Pelman plaintiﬀs had earlier ﬁled suit against four fast food chains before
withdrawing their complaint.6 Why then do the plaintiﬀs only ultimately sue McDonald’s?
Although the plaintiﬀs ignore this question in their briefs, they presumably saw a tactical advantage in
ﬁling against only one fast food chain. As is later discussed, the plaintiﬀs were required to show a causal
link between their consumption of McDonald’s products and their obesity, while discounting other potential
causes of obesity. Had the plaintiﬀs pursued this case against four fast food chains, they would have had
a harder time drawing the requisite causal relationship between any single fast food restaurant and their
obesity. Additional restaurant defendants would make any proximate cause determination harder for at least
two reasons.
5I have no comment about whether these tactical advantages aﬀect the attorney’s decision to pursue one of the suits over
the other. I merely point out the legal and tactical beneﬁts that ensued.
6See e.g., McDonald’s Appellee Brief, 2004 WL 1497855 at *21 (hereinafter “Brief for Defendant-Appellee”)
7First, the more defendants a plaintiﬀ sues, the less it appears any single defendant, rather than the plaintiﬀ
him or herself, caused the plaintiﬀ’s obesity. After all, if a single plaintiﬀ accused dozens of restaurants
or food manufacturers of causing his obesity, it would be apparent that none of the defendants were as
responsible for the plaintiﬀ’s obesity as he was. Second, a plaintiﬀ that accuses multiple defendants of
causing an indeﬁnite injury like obesity faces the diﬃcult task of showing to what extent each defendant is
culpable for the injury.7 This requirement adds another layer of complexity to an already novel and complex
suit.8 For these reasons, it’s possible the Pelman plaintiﬀs (or rather, their attorney) consciously chose to
sue one fast food chain and avoid these additional complications.
II.
The Pelman Original Complaint & McDonald’s Defenses
The Pelman’s original Complaint listed ﬁve separate causes of action. The ﬁrst two Counts were based on
New York’s statutory consumer fraud provisions. The last three causes of action were all based on common
law tort doctrine. Speciﬁcally, the third Count was a novel application of products liability law. The last two
causes of action were both premised on McDonald’s failure to warn of its products’ unhealthy characteristics.
A.
The Consumer Fraud Protection Claims: Counts I and II.
7See generally Epstein, Richard, Cases and Materials on Torts, 385 – 413 (7th ed. 2000).
8Id.
8The plaintiﬀs’ ﬁrst cause of action stated that McDonald’s engaged in unfair and deceptive acts in violation
of New York’s consumer fraud statutes, New York General Business Law §§349, 350. Section 349 prohibits
deceptive acts and practices and §350 prohibits false advertising. The plaintiﬀs alleged McDonald’s violated
both consumer fraud statutes by:
failing to adequately disclose the ingredients and/or health eﬀects of ingestion of certain
respective food products with high levels of fat, salt, sugar, and cholesterol content...by pro-
moting, marketing, distributing their food as nutritious; by engaging in marketing practices
which enticed the Plaintiﬀ-Class members to consume their respective products in larger
portions...by failing to adequately label and/or provide the nutritional contents of their
respective food products...and by otherwise engaging in deceptive marketing practices and
promotions of their respective food products.9
This ﬁrst count alleges McDonald’s committed aﬃrmatively deceptive acts and deceptive acts of omission.
McDonald’s aﬃrmatively promoted and marketed its food as nutritious, and enticed the plaintiﬀs to eat
larger portions. As well, it deceived the plaintiﬀs by failing to disclose the unhealthy ingredients and health
eﬀects of its products, by failing to disclose the unhealthy eﬀects of eating large portions, and by failing
to provide nutritional information for its products. Generalizing from the speciﬁcs of these claims, the
plaintiﬀs’ ﬁrst count can be characterized as follows: McDonald’s violated New York’s consumer fraud
statute by misrepresenting – aﬃrmatively and by omission – how healthy (or unhealthy) its products are.
To factually support this claim, the plaintiﬀs attached over three-dozen ads or statements that they allege
misrepresent, individually or collectively, the health attributes of McDonald’s products.
9McDonald’s countered this claim with three defenses. First, McDonald’s argued that the plaintiﬀs failed to
show why its ads or statements, the majority of which are “product puﬀery,” were false.10 Next, McDonald’s
contended that the plaintiﬀs cannot claim the ads are deceptive since the health eﬀects of consuming or over-
consuming fast food are well known. Therefore, no reasonable consumer can be misled by either McDonald’s
product puﬀery or its omission of any information.11 Lastly, McDonald’s maintained claims of deceptive
omissions (i.e., a failure to disclose material information) cannot be brought under New York’s consumer
fraud provisions except in rare circumstances, none of which apply to the case at hand.
The plaintiﬀs’ second cause of action, another consumer fraud claim, was that McDonald’s directed its
marketing at children, falsely promoting its food as nutritious and failing to disclose the food’s adverse
health eﬀects.12 To bolster this claim, the plaintiﬀs listed several allegedly deceptive representations directed
at children. The plaintiﬀs argued McDonald’s enticed minors to consume its products with misleading
promotional incentives.13 For example, the plaintiﬀs alleged that McDonald’s “Mighty Kids” ads were
deceptive because they lacked any scientiﬁc support for the implied claims that eating these meals will make
kids physically stronger or ‘mightier.’14 The plaintiﬀs also argued that the misleading nature of McDonald’s
regular ads and its child-directed ads should be judged from a child’s point of view, not from the more
discerning adult’s vantage point. In other words, when a court evaluates whether or not the minor plaintiﬀs
were deceived by all of McDonald’s ads, it should adopt a reasonable child standard of common knowledge.15
In response, McDonald’s asserted two points. First, it argued that a plaintiﬀ’s age is irrelevant to deter-
10Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition to Plaintiﬀs’ Motion to Remand and Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, 2002 WL 32595646, at *16. (hereinafter “Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition”)
11Pelman I. at 18.
12Original Complaint at 8.
13Id.
14Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo in Support of Cross-Motion to Remand, 2002 WL 3249600, at *5. (hereinafter “Plaintiﬀs’ Reply
Memo”)
15Id. at 3.
10mining whether a reasonable consumer would be misled by any alleged misrepresentations. If ads are mere
puﬀery when directed at adults, they remain mere puﬀery when viewed by minors.16 McDonald’s likewise
characterized the Mighty Meals and other child-directed advertisements as mere product puﬀery. Second,
McDonald’s asserted that many of the allegedly deceptive representations could not have misled the minor
plaintiﬀs since most of the listed representations would be ignored by children. Speciﬁcally, McDonald’s
noted that “McDonald’s website information, the brochures and advertisements discussing balanced diet,
and the sixteen-year-old letter to the New York Attorney General obviously are not directed to children and
would not, in anyone’s imagination, be of interest to them.”17
B.
The Tort Claims: Counts III – V.
The plaintiﬀs’ three remaining counts alleged common law torts. In Count III, the plaintiﬀs claimed that
McDonald’s negligently or intentionally distributed foods high in fat, salt, sugar, and cholesterol content,
which cause adverse health problems.18 This is the plaintiﬀs’ boldest claim and parts most from traditional
tort precedent. In this Count, the plaintiﬀs argued that McDonald’s is liable simply for serving products
with characteristics that cause harmful health eﬀects. Whether it acted intentionally or negligently, selling
products high in fat, salt, sugar, and cholesterol content is a tort.
McDonald’s did not speciﬁcally rebut this tort claim, but oﬀered two general reasons why all three of the
16Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition at *19.
17Id.
18Original Complaint at 8.
11plaintiﬀs’ tort claims failed. McDonald’s contended that the plaintiﬀs failed to allege two of the necessary
elements for any tort claim: (1) that the defendant has a duty towards the plaintiﬀ, and (2) that there exists
a proximate causal link between the defendant’s act and the plaintiﬀ’s injury.19 Summarizing the defects in
the plaintiﬀs’ claims, McDonald’s noted that,
American tort law does not impose on restaurants a duty to warn customers of the uni-
versally understood fact that common foods contain fat, sugar, salt cholesterol and other
basic ingredients. See Restatement (Second) Torts, §402A, cmt. j. It is commonly under-
stood that [excessively eating] hamburgers and French fries...over a prolonged period may
have consequences to one’s waistline and potentially to one’s health...The plaintiﬀs fare
no better on causation...their physical conditions are inherently the result of a combina-
tion of so many factors and inﬂuences that attempting to attribute proximate cause to the
consumption of certain of the products served at McDonald’s is impossible as a matter of
law.20
McDonald’s owed no duty towards the plaintiﬀs because their injuries are a commonly known side eﬀect of
prolonged or over-consumption of fast food. Since it owed the plaintiﬀs no duty, it could not have breached
any duty towards them and therefore didn’t commit any tort. Second, the plaintiﬀs cannot prove that a
complex, multifactor condition such as obesity (and related health problems) resulted because they consumed
one restaurant’s products.
The plaintiﬀs fourth count repeats the same Count III allegations that McDonald’s products are unhealthy,
but premises liability on its failure to warn consumers of its products ingredients, levels of fat, salt, sugar,
19Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition at *3-5,13.
12and cholesterol, and the dire health problems that can ensue.21 In other words, this count is not premised on
McDonald’s sale of unhealthy food per se, but on its failure to adequately disclose the ingredients, nutritional
content, and detrimental health eﬀects of its products.
Finally, the plaintiﬀs allege, in their ﬁfth and ﬁnal count, that McDonald’s “negligently, recklessly, carelessly
and/or intentionally...[distributed]...food products that are physically or psychologically addictive.”22 This
cause of action alleges that McDonald’s caused its consumers to become physically or psychologically addicted
to products that cause adverse health eﬀects.
III.
First S.D.N.Y Court Opinion: January 22, 2003.
In its ﬁrst opinion, the district court separately addressed the consumer fraud and tort claims. In setting
the context for the tort claims, the court stated,
[q]uestions of personal responsibility, common knowledge and public health are presented,
and the role of society and the courts in addressing such issues. The issue of determining the
breadth of personal responsibility underlies much of the law: where should the line be drawn
between an individual’s responsibility to take care of herself, and society’s responsibility to
ensure that others shield her?23
21Original Complaint at 9.
22Id at 10.
13Having laid out this general directive, the court focused on the case at hand and noted that one “necessary
element of any potentially viable claim must be that McDonald’s products involve a danger that is not within
the common knowledge of consumers.”24 After generally describing the tort claim requirements, the court
pointed out the more expansive reach of New York’s consumer fraud statutes, stating that these statutes
were “intended to be broadly applicable, extending beyond the reach of common law fraud.”25
A.
Consumer Protection Act Claims.
The court listed the requirements for a cause of action under either of New York’s consumer fraud statutes
as follows: (1) that the act, practice or advertisement was consumer-oriented; (2) that the act, practice
or advertisement was misleading in a material respect, and (3) that the plaintiﬀ was injured as a result of
the deceptive practice, act or advertisement.26 Focusing in on the second requirement, the district court
dismissed both Counts I and II. Ultimately, the court determined that none of the ads or statements were
objectively misleading. In discussing McDonald’s allegedly deceptive representations, the court ﬁrst noted
that the plaintiﬀs’ “Complaint does not identify a single instance of deceptive acts.”27 The court then stated
that even in their opposition papers, the plaintiﬀs could only identify two alleged, aﬃrmative misrepresen-
tations.28
24Id. at 517.
25Id. at 525.
26Id.
27Id. at 527.
28In discussing these alleged misrepresentations, the court ignored, for the moment, McDonald’s argument that these ads
were not properly in the Complaint and thus should not be considered.
14The ﬁrst set of allegedly deceptive ads were a couple of McDonald’s advertising campaigns (“McChicken
Everyday!” and “Big N’ Tasty Everyday”) and the second was a statement on McDonald’s website that
“McDonald’s can be part of any balanced diet and lifestyle.”29 The court noted that read together, these
statements could be construed to imply that eating a McChicken or ‘Big ‘N Tasty’ product everyday could
be part of a balanced diet and lifestyle, but dismissed that implication, stating that “the advertisements
encouraging persons to eat at McDonald’s everyday! do not include any indication that doing so is part of
a well-balanced diet.”30 The court likewise dismissed the plaintiﬀs’ second contention, that the “McChicken
Everyday!” and “Big N’ Tasty Everyday” representations are deceptive in and of themselves. Absent any
statements by McDonald’s that eating either product everyday will result in a speciﬁc health eﬀect, the court
held such campaigns were mere puﬀery.
The second subset of claims under Count I, McDonald’s deceptive omissions, was likewise dismissed. As listed
in their Complaint, the allegedly deceptive omissions were McDonald’s failure to disclose the ingredients,
health eﬀects, and nutritional content of its food products. The court dismissed these claims because the
plaintiﬀs failed to give any reasons why such omissions were deceptive. Interpreting earlier case law on
deceptive omissions under New York’s consumer fraud provisions, the court held that for an omission to
be deceptive, the plaintiﬀs must show either that the business alone possesses the information or that a
consumer could not reasonably obtain it.31 In so holding, the court agreed with McDonald’s that it is not
enough for the plaintiﬀs to allege the defendant did not provide relevant information.
The plaintiﬀs’ other consumer fraud claim, Count II, alleged that McDonald’s deceptively marketed its prod-
29Id. at 528.
30Id.
31Id. at 529.
15ucts to children, through both aﬃrmative misrepresentations and deceptive omissions. To support this claim,
the plaintiﬀs appended the same representations they claimed were deceptive in Count I. As with Count I,
however, the court determined that none of these ads or statements were in fact materially deceptive.32 The
court also determined the child-directed ad campaigns were also non-misleading for two reasons. First, the
court noted that McDonald’s had not made any speciﬁc health claims regarding consumption of its ‘Mighty
Kids Meals.’33 Second, if the plaintiﬀs were alleging that just the label “Mighty Kids Meal” was deceptive,
the court dismissed that claim ﬁnding the name to be ‘mere puﬀery.’34 The court held that McDonald’s
was not deceptively representing that children who consumed these meals would become stronger or mighty
because they marketed their meals as “Mighty Kids Meals.”35
B.
Common Law Tort Claims.
The plaintiﬀs’ remaining three counts alleged various negligent or intentional torts. As with any tort claim,
the plaintiﬀs had to allege (1): the defendant had a duty towards them, (2) the defendants breached that
duty, (3) the plaintiﬀs suﬀered an injury, and (4) the defendant’s breach proximate caused the plaintiﬀs’
injuries. In dismissing these tort claims, the district court focused on two of these four elements. The court
held that the plaintiﬀs had failed to show McDonald’s had any duty to warn the plaintiﬀs of the adverse
32Id. at 530.
33Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo at *2.
34Pelman I. at 530.
35Id.
16health eﬀects of consuming its products. Additionally, the court held the plaintiﬀs failed to adequately plead
that McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries. Before discussing why McDonald’s did not have any
duty towards the plaintiﬀs or how the plaintiﬀs could adequately plead proximate causation, the court ﬁrst
addressed Count III, the plaintiﬀs’ claim that McDonald’s was liable simply for serving certain of its products.
1.
Count III: Inherently Dangerous Product.
In Count III the plaintiﬀs alleged that McDonald’s served an inherently dangerous product. The plaintiﬀs
contended that by serving “products that are high in fat, salt, sugar, and cholesterol which [cause adverse
health eﬀects]” McDonald’s was liable for their resulting injuries.36 There are two diﬀerent possibilities for
why McDonald’s might be liable under an inherently dangerous product doctrine. Liability might attach if
a product is dangerous to an extent not contemplated by a purchaser or if it’s unreasonably dangerous for
its intended use, regardless of the plaintiﬀ’s knowledge. While a warning would insulate a defendant from
the ﬁrst type of claim, it would not insulate the defendant from the latter type of argument. In its reply
brief, McDonald’s defended against this claim by pointing out that fast food’s attributes are well known
and therefore cannot create liability as an inherently dangerous product.37 Citing from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, McDonald’s also noted that the plaintiﬀs’ injuries resulted from excessive consumption
of these products, and as such, they faced an even greater burden in showing its products are unreasonably
dangerous.38 In addressing these two aspects of the inherently dangerous product arguments, the district
36Original Complaint at 8.
37Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition at *5.
38Id.
17court agreed with McDonald’s, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or
drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption...Good butter
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in
the arteries and leads to heart attacks.39
As such, because the plaintiﬀs’ injuries resulted from the over-consumption of McDonald’s products, they
faced an even higher bar in alleging the products are unreasonably dangerous for their intended use. The
court then held that the plaintiﬀs’ bare allegation that McDonald’s products were high in fat, salt, sugar,
and cholesterol, standing alone, was not an allegation that McDonald’s products were so extraordinarily
unhealthy as to be unreasonably dangerous for their intended use.40
As to the second reason a product might be deemed inherently dangerous, that it is dangerous to an extent
outside the reasonable contemplation of the consuming public, the district court likewise dismissed that
claim. The court noted that it is well known that fast food, particularly McDonald’s products, contains
high levels of salt, sugar, fat and cholesterol. Again citing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court
held that “a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which are only
dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of time, when the
danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized.”41
40Id. at 532.
41Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §420A, cmt. j)
18C.
Allegations Outside the Complaint.
After addressing and dismissing the arguments within the Complaint, the district court turned to four ad-
ditional arguments the plaintiﬀs made outside the Complaint. The court made clear that these arguments,
only made in opposition papers, were not properly before the court. Nevertheless, it addressed these ar-
guments to guide the plaintiﬀs in drafting an amended complaint, since they were granted leave to amend.
The court also discussed these arguments before moving on to the ﬁnal two tort-based Counts in the Com-
plaint because these four arguments related to all three of the plaintiﬀs’ tort-based Counts. Therefore, after
dismissing Count III based solely on the allegations in the Complaint, the court addressed whether any of
these four arguments, if further elaborated in an amended complaint, could revive this count.
First, the plaintiﬀs argued that McDonald’s products have been so processed or altered that they are com-
pletely diﬀerent and more dangerous than the typical products they resembled and which a reasonable
consumer might expect.42 Additionally, they claimed McDonald’s owed the plaintiﬀs a duty to warn of pos-
sible allergic reactions to its products. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀs’ asserted that “the Defendants know that
the Plaintiﬀs and consumers develop physical reactions (obesity/ diabetes/ hypertension) to the presence
of fat, sodium and cholesterol in their foods, yet have failed to warn of the known risks of consumption
of their foods.”43 Next, the plaintiﬀs alleged that McDonald’s knew and had a duty to warn against the
plaintiﬀs’ misuse of its products, by prolonged and excessive consumption.44 Finally, the plaintiﬀs put forth
several public policy oriented arguments based upon the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act.45 The court
42Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo at *5.
43Id.
44Id. at *6.
45Id.
19assessed these arguments and how any of them might lead to viable claims.
1.
Overly Processed or Altered Foods.
The ﬁrst, and most promising, of the plaintiﬀs’ additional claims was that McDonald’s products were some-
how diﬀerent in kind and more dangerous than the ordinary fast food fare it resembled. With this allegation,
the plaintiﬀs could sidestep McDonald’s defense that the fat, salt, sugar and cholesterol content of its prod-
ucts were “common knowledge.” In fact, the plaintiﬀs asserted that while the Restatement of Torts (3d)
referred to users’ common knowledge of saturated fats and its eﬀects, “said principle does not apply where
these Defendants are selling “altered” common foods with additives and preservatives that morphs their
original composition.”46 Therefore, while McDonald’s might not be liable for serving ordinary fast food,
with known attributes, it might be liable for serving products that resembled fast food, but was in fact much
more dangerous. As the district court analogized,
[t]he argument is akin to one that might be used in a products liability case regarding ge-
netically engineered food, should any injuries result from the excessive consumption thereof.
The genetically modiﬁed [crops] look exactly like the organically grown [crops]. Yet those
plants have been substantively, if subtly, modiﬁed into something else. Any dangers from
eating a genetically modiﬁed plant are latent–and thus not commonly well known–in the
absence of a label. (footnotes omitted)47
46Id. at *5.
20Following this reasoning, the court held that the plaintiﬀs could present a viable claim if they properly
alleged that while McDonald’s products resembled common fast foods, they were somehow diﬀerent and
posed latent dangers.
A similar yet subtly diﬀerent claim based on this argument could be that McDonald’s processing made its
food unhealthier than contemplated by the average consumer.48 In such a case, consumers may well know
they are consuming ‘unhealthy’ products such as burgers, French fries and fried chicken, but may not be
aware that McDonald’s processes its products to be even unhealthier than originally contemplated. If that
was the case, the plaintiﬀs’ presumed knowledge of fast food attributes would not include the additional,
latent dangers of McDonald’s fare. In such a case, McDonald’s would have a duty to warn consumers about
the eﬀects of this additional processing. In either variation of this claim, the plaintiﬀs argue that McDonald’s
has a duty to warn consumers of the latent dangers of its processed products. That danger might arise from
either the additives and preservatives in the products, or from the substantially unhealthier composition of
these altered foods (i.e., they are processed to make them have more salt, fat, cholesterol, and sugar that
the non-altered fast foods they resemble).
McDonald’s presented three defenses to this argument. First, McDonald’s contended that the presence or
absence of additives is irrelevant to the plaintiﬀs’ arguments, since their “entire Complaint is premised on the
assertion that they did not know that common foods such as hamburgers, French fries, and apple pie have
fat, salt, and cholesterol.”49 If they disclaimed knowledge that these products could cause their obesity, the
presence or absence of other additives and preservatives is irrelevant. Next, McDonald’s argued that its use of
approved additives or preservatives is not an “alteration” of its products that makes them diﬀerent from other
48Id. at 535.
49Defendant’s Consolidated Opposition at *10.
21manufactured foods. Indeed, McDonald’s contended that “[i]f the addition of preservatives, salt, or sugar to
raw food is product alteration, then virtually all food is altered.”50 Simply, McDonald’s asserted that there
is nothing diﬀerent about its processing than is done with virtually all foods manufactured outside the home
kitchen. Finally, McDonald’s maintained that even if restaurant food could be legitimately labeled ‘altered’
by the addition of additives and preservatives, it still had no duty to warn the public of this “alteration”
because it is common knowledge that restaurants put additives and preservatives in their products and that
such alteration renders their food less healthy.51
Notably, the court reserved judgment on the merits of this last argument and stated that if the plaintiﬀs
ﬂeshed out their food alteration argument in an amended complaint, they may “establish that the dangers
of McDonald’s products were not commonly well known and thus McDonald’s had a duty towards its cus-
tomers.”52 While the court did not spell out what additional factual allegations would be required to ﬂesh
out this argument, it presumably expected the plaintiﬀs to factually support one or both of these claims.
The plaintiﬀs could attempt to provide data that certain additives or preservatives make McDonald’s prod-
ucts unhealthier than common fast foods. Alternatively, the plaintiﬀs might factually support their claim
that McDonald’s processed its products to include more salt, fat, sugar, and cholesterol than a consumer
would reasonably expect. By inviting the plaintiﬀs to include either of these arguments, the court implicitly
rejected McDonald’s defense that it is common knowledge that McDonald’s processes its products and that
any processing renders food less healthy.
50Id.
51Id.
52Pelman I. at 536.
222.
Plaintiﬀs’ Remaining Arguments: Allergic Reaction, Foreseeable Misuse, NLEA Policy Points.
The other grounds for sustaining the common law tort claims were less well received by the district court,
which summarily dismissed them all as unviable. One of the plaintiﬀs’ arguments, that they were allergic
to the ingredients in McDonald’s products, was easily dismissed. Although the plaintiﬀs did not elaborate
on this claim, the basis of this claim seems to be that they suﬀered ‘physical reactions’ from consuming
McDonald’s products because they were allergic to the salt, sugar, fat and cholesterol in McDonald’s prod-
ucts. The physical, allergy-like reactions the plaintiﬀs experienced included obesity and hypertension.53 In
essence, the plaintiﬀs asserted they experienced a physical reaction comparable to a typical allergic reaction
and McDonald’s should be liable for failing to warn of these ‘allergens.’ Rather than discuss the hypothetical
similarity of traditional food allergen liability law and this novel comparison to physical reactions from fat,
salt, sugar and cholesterol, the court pointed out an obvious deﬁciency in the plaintiﬀs’ allegations. Citing
to the Restatement (Third) Torts, Product Liability, §2, the court held that to state a claim for allergic
sensitivity,
the ingredient that causes the allergic reaction must be one whose danger or whose presence
in the product is not generally known to consumers. When both the presence of an allergenic
ingredient in the product and the risks presented by such an ingredient are widely known,
instructions and warnings about that danger are unnecessary.54
As such, even assuming arguendo that one can be ‘allergic’ to or suﬀer a physical reaction from the above
53Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo at *5.
23ingredients, this argument still failed because the presence of such ingredients in McDonald’s products is
commonly known. Furthermore, the court also noted that the plaintiﬀs failed to adequately allege that these
ingredients were in fact allergens or similar to allergens.
Next, the plaintiﬀs asserted that McDonald’s had a duty to warn them and other consumers against prolonged
and unreasonable uses of its products. The plaintiﬀs alleged that McDonald’s should have expected that some
consumers would misuse its products by eating them on a prolonged or excessive basis. Since McDonald’s
should have expected this foreseeable misuse of its products, it had a duty to warn consumers of the dangers
resulting from this misuse.55 The court quickly dispatched this claim, noting that the plaintiﬀs failed to
allege that “what is at issue is a misuse in the sense that it was outside the scope of the apparent purpose
for which the [products] were manufactured.”56 The court noted that McDonald’s products are intended to
be eaten and the plaintiﬀs cited no case law that over-consumption of a food product can be considered a
misuse.
Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiﬀs’ policy arguments based on the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act (“NLEA”) as irrelevant to the statutory and common law causes of action they were asserting. Whether
or not the federal government could institute enforcement proceedings against McDonald’s under the NLEA
was irrelevant to plaintiﬀs’ claims that McDonald’s violated tort law principles or New York’s consumer
fraud provisions. Moreover, the court noted that restaurants were speciﬁcally exempted from the NLEA,
55Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo at *6.
56Pelman I. at 537. (citing Trivino v. Jamesway Corp., 148 A.D.2d 851 (3rd Dep’t 1989)).
24which requires nutritional labeling for food manufacturers.57
D.
Proximate Cause.
After dispensing with the plaintiﬀs’ various arguments for why McDonald’s had (and consequently breached)
a duty towards its consumers, the court turned to the second contested element in all the plaintiﬀs’ claims;
proximate causation. Before outlining some of the deﬁciencies in the plaintiﬀs’ proximate cause allegation,
the court laid out its understanding of proximate cause and how proximate cause diﬀers from simple or ‘but
for’ causation. The court began by noting that to show proximate cause “a plaintiﬀ must establish that the
defendant’s conduct was a substantial cause in bringing about the harm.”58 The court also listed several
relevant factors, including the aggregate number of actors contributing to the injury, whether some forces
contributing to the injury were beyond the defendant’s control, and whether the injury would have occurred
without the defendant’s conduct.59 Additionally, the court approvingly cited the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §431, which states that proximate cause is used
57Id.
58Id. at 537-38.
59Id. at 538.
25to denote the fact that the defendant’s conduct has such an eﬀect in producing the harm as
to lead reasonable [persons] to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in
which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called ’philosophic
sense,’ which includes every one of the great number of events without which any happening
would not have occurred.60
This particular explanation of proximate cause, emphasizing a notion of responsibility rather than simple
causation is especially relevant in this case. As the court noted to begin its opinion, “[t]he issue of determining
the breadth of personal responsibility underlies much of the law: where should the line be drawn between an
individual’s own responsibility to take care of herself, and society’s responsibility to ensure that others shield
her?”61 For McDonald’s to have proximately caused the plaintiﬀs’ injuries, its conduct must somehow make
it responsible for the plaintiﬀs’ injuries. Having thus described proximate cause, the district court then held
that the plaintiﬀs had not adequately alleged that McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries.
To properly allege this causal relationship, the plaintiﬀs needed to make additional factual allegations. For
example, the court noted that the Complaint did not specify how often the plaintiﬀs ate at McDonald’s.
Without that factual information, the court had no way of deciding whether McDonald’s could have possibly
been a substantial cause of the plaintiﬀs’ injuries, as a matter of law. Presumably, if the plaintiﬀs only ate
at McDonald’s a few times a year, their entire Complaint would be dismissed for lack of proximate cause,
regardless of any breached duties by McDonald’s.62 This initial deﬁciency in the Complaint was subsequently
rectiﬁed in the Amended Complaint, which alleged that the plaintiﬀs ate at McDonald’s on a fairly substantial
daily or weekly basis.63 Additionally, to properly allege proximate cause, the court held that the plaintiﬀs
61Id. at 516.
62Id. at 538-39
63Plaintiﬀs Amended Veriﬁed Complaint, 2003 WL 234873 at *5-7 (hereinafter “Amended Complaint”).
26must address whether other factors were signiﬁcant causes of their obesity and related health problems.
In other words, to adequately allege that McDonald’s caused their health problems, the plaintiﬀs needed
to assert that other variables, outside of McDonald’s control, had not caused their obesity. This proximate
cause showing is actually a two-part requirement. First, the court required that the plaintiﬀs’ show that
their obesity is the result of their diet, as opposed to non-dietary factors. In fact, the court speciﬁcally noted
that the Complaint stated “[o]besity is a complex multifactoral chronic disease developing from interactive
inﬂuences of numerous factors – social behavioral, physiological, metabolic, cellular, and molecular in addition
to cultural and genetic factors.”64 As such, the plaintiﬀs could not allege McDonald’s proximately caused
their injuries if they had not yet adequately alleged that their diet, not non-diet factors, was the primary
cause of their obesity and health problems.65 Moreover, the court also required that the plaintiﬀs adequately
show that it was McDonald’s products, not the rest of their diet, that caused their obesity and related health
problems.
The court therefore dismissed the plaintiﬀs’ tort claims for two independent reasons. As noted above, the
court held that the plaintiﬀs had failed to explain why McDonald’s owed them any duty to warn about its
products. Aside from the summarily stated food alteration argument, the plaintiﬀs had failed to explain
why these products’ unhealthy attributes were not commonly known. Additionally, the court held that the
plaintiﬀs also failed to allege McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries. Given the complex interaction of
non-diet factors that can cause obesity and other health problems, the plaintiﬀs had not adequately alleged
that their diet was the proximate or substantial cause of their obesity. Moreover, even assuming that diet
was the primary cause of their obesity, the plaintiﬀs had also failed to show that McDonald’s was the primary
64Pelman I. at 539.
65Id.
27or substantial cause of their obesity. After thoroughly analyzing (and dismissing) the plaintiﬀs’ arguments
for why McDonald’s had a duty towards them or proximately caused their obesity, the court applied these
legal conclusions to the plaintiﬀs’ remaining tort claims.
E.
Count IV: Failure to Warn of Unhealthy Attributes.
The plaintiﬀs’ fourth cause of action alleged that McDonald’s failed to warn of its products’ unhealthy
attributes and failed to label those products. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀs claimed that McDonald’s failed
to warn about the ingredients and nutritional contents of its products, and the adverse health eﬀects of
consuming such products. The court noted that under New York law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
a product’s latent dangers resulting from a product’s foreseeable uses or misuses.66 New York law, however,
recognizes two situations in which a failure to warn would not result in liability: (1) where the danger is
“open and obvious” or (2) where a knowledgeable user already knows of the danger.67
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the court held McDonald’s did not have a duty to warn the
plaintiﬀs, as any harmful results from consumption of its products were open and obvious. As noted above,
the court held that the plaintiﬀs failed to allege that McDonald’s products were dangerous in any way other
that those which were open and obvious.68 The court hinted, however, that if the plaintiﬀs developed their
food alteration argument, they might successfully allege that McDonald’s did have a duty to warn regarding
66Id. at 540 (citing Liriano v. Hobart Corp. 700 N.E. 2d 303 (1998)).
67Id. at 541.
68Id.
28a danger that was not open and obvious.
As with the other tort claims, the court also held that the plaintiﬀs had not suﬃciently pled that McDonald’s
proximately caused their injuries. Again, as described above, the plaintiﬀs would need to show that their
diet was the primary cause of their obesity and that McDonald’s products, and not other food, was the
leading dietary factor causing their obesity.
F.
Count V: Sale of Addictive Products.
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiﬀs’ last cause of action – a cursorily stated claim that McDonald’s
served physically and/or psychologically addictive foods.69 The court noted the vagueness of this claim and
treated it as either another products’ liability claim or a failure to warn claim. In other words, the court
interpreted the claim to state that McDonald’s products are inherently dangerous because they are addictive,
or that McDonald’s has a duty to warn that its products are addictive. 70 Unlike earlier allegations of general
unhealthiness, this allegation is not “open and obvious” and McDonald’s would surely have a duty to warn
consumers if its products were addictive. Nevertheless, the court dismissed this claim as overly vague. The
court held that simply claiming McDonald’s products were addictive, without any speciﬁc, supporting factual
allegations was inadequate.
69Original Complaint at 10.
70Pelman I. at 542.
29It was unclear from the Complaint whether the plaintiﬀs were asserting that McDonald’s intentionally used
an additive that made its food addictive or whether the combination of fats and sugars in its products are
naturally addictive. More importantly, the plaintiﬀs did not list any ways in which this addiction could be
observed, why they believed they were addicted, how long it took for such an addiction to take hold, and
other basic questions.71
G.
Summary of Complaint’s Deﬁciencies.
Having dismissed every count in the Complaint, the court granted the plaintiﬀs leave to amend their Com-
plaint. While the court noted “leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires,” it cautioned
the plaintiﬀs to address the deﬁciencies in its Complaint.72 Speciﬁcally, the court emphasized two glaring
weaknesses in their tort claims. First, the plaintiﬀs had failed to show why McDonald’s had any duty to
warn its customers of the unhealthy attributes of its products. The court held that any such duty would
arise only if some of the products’ unhealthy attributes were not common knowledge. Additionally, the court
emphasized that the plaintiﬀs’ proximate cause allegations were woefully inadequate. To suﬃciently plead
that McDonald’s had proximately caused their obesity and related health problems, the plaintiﬀs had to
address two knotty causation issues.
First, the plaintiﬀs had to make enough factual allegations in their Complaint to make clear that their diet,
71Id.
72Pelman I. at 543.
30and not other non-dietary factors, caused their obesity and related diseases. Additionally, the court held
that the plaintiﬀs must describe the rest of their diet in suﬃcient detail that a question of fact arises as
to whether it was McDonald’s products, and not the rest of their diet, that caused their obesity. In other
words, even if they discounted the eﬀect of non-dietary factors in causing their obesity, they still had to show
that McDonald’s products were the primary cause of their obesity.
With respect to the plaintiﬀs’ two consumer fraud claims, the court dismissed those for diﬀerent reasons.
While the plaintiﬀs still needed to allege proximate cause, the court recognized that statutory consumer fraud
claims had an easier proximate cause standard. Rather than discuss whether the plaintiﬀs met that relaxed
standard, the court dismissed the consumer fraud claims for a diﬀerent reason; the Complaint did not identify
a single instance of deceptive acts.73 Simply put, the plaintiﬀs had not listed any objectively deceptive acts,
practices, or representations. Moreover, to the extent the plaintiﬀs alleged deceptive omissions of relevant
information, they failed to show why any omissions were deceptive. For an omission to be actionable under
New York consumer fraud law, the plaintiﬀs had to show that only the defendant possessed the relevant
information or that no reasonable consumer could attain it, a requirement the plaintiﬀs failed to fulﬁll.74
73Id. at 527.
74Id. at 529.
31IV.
On Remand: Plaintiﬀs’ Claims and McDonald’s Defenses.
A.
Plaintiﬀs’ Amended Complaint.
In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiﬀs brought four causes of action. The ﬁrst three counts were for
deceptive acts and advertisements in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Laws §§349 and 350, New York’s consumer
fraud statutes. The last cause of action, a tort claim alleging both products liability and failure to warn,
was voluntarily abandoned prior to oral arguments. As such, the court deemed that claim waived and never
addressed it. Before addressing the plaintiﬀs’ consumer fraud claims, I analyze their withdrawn tort claim
below.
1.
Abandoned Tort Claim.
The plaintiﬀs’ abandoned tort claim alleged that McDonald’s had negligently (or intentionally) sold products,
“which were so processed with additives and other ingredients and preservatives, as to create a danger and
hazard unknown to the Plaintiﬀ purchasers and consumers.”75 Seizing on the court’s suggestion that food
75Amended Complaint at *46
32might be so altered or processed as to create a duty to warn of its processed and unhealthy attributes, the
plaintiﬀs put forth two arguments. First, the plaintiﬀs alleged McDonald’s had a duty to warn about these
products because they were so processed and ﬁlled with additives that they created an unknown danger.
Additionally, after exhaustively listing the ingredients, calories and fat content of the Fish Filet, French fries,
and Chicken McNuggets, the plaintiﬀs made another argument. They alleged that McDonald’s processing
of these products made the products more fatty and caloric than a reasonable consumer would ever expect.
Speciﬁcally, they claimed that the products’
reformulated attributes were hazardous or detrimental to an extent beyond which was con-
templated or understood by the reasonable and ordinary Plaintiﬀ...relying on the ordinary
and customary knowledge of the community regarding the accepted characteristics and com-
position of Chicken, Fish, Potatoes and seasonings.76
They asserted that McDonald’s products appeared like normal chicken sandwiches, ﬁsh sandwiches, and
French fries, but because of how they were prepared, these products contain much more fat and calories
than the ordinary foods they resembled. They then alleged that if McDonald’s had properly disclosed these
characteristics they would not have eaten these products as voluminously and incurred their health problems.
Ultimately, it appears that the plaintiﬀs dropped this separate cause of action for at least two reasons. First,
in that this tort claim repeated the same allegations underlying one of their consumer fraud claims, it was
duplicative. As discussed below, the plaintiﬀs base a consumer fraud claim on the allegation that McDon-
ald’s processed its products in a way that makes them unhealthier. Additionally, and more importantly, the
plaintiﬀs sought to avoid the diﬃcult proximate cause requirement for tort claims that the district court laid
33out in its ﬁrst opinion. As noted above, for the plaintiﬀs to assert a valid tort claim, they would have to
allege a proximate causal link between McDonald’s breached duty and their injuries. This burden included
specifying whether non-dietary factors contributed to the plaintiﬀs’ obesity and outlining the rest of their
diets. The plaintiﬀs sought to avoid these knotty proximate cause issues by only pleading consumer fraud
claims, which have a less daunting proximate cause requirement than tort claims. Since the plaintiﬀs may
have believed these tort claims added little to their overall claims, they presumably decided to avoid having
to litigate this stricter proximate cause requirement.
2.
Consumer Fraud Causes of Action.
In their Amended Complaint, the plaintiﬀs set forth three distinct claims of deceptive practices and adver-
tisements that proximately caused their injuries. First, they claimed McDonald’s engaged in an extensive
and widespread advertising campaign to promote its products as healthier than in fact. Speciﬁcally, they al-
leged that McDonald’s advertisements suggested that its products “were nutritious, of a beneﬁcial nutritional
nature/eﬀect, and/or easily part of a healthy lifestyle if consumed on a daily basis.”77 The plaintiﬀs alleged
they relied on these characterizations and as a result, consumed McDonald’s products in larger quantities
and with greater frequency than they would have otherwise and consequently incurred signiﬁcant health
problems.
As discussed in greater detail below, the plaintiﬀs contended that in assessing an ad’s deceptiveness, the
77Amended Complaint at *40.
34court should not only consider whether the ad is deceptive in and of itself. Rather, the appropriate approach
would be to assess whether the overall eﬀect of these ads, viewed cumulatively, created a long-term deceptive
impression that McDonald’s products were healthier than in fact.78 The plaintiﬀs claimed that whether or
not speciﬁc ads were deceptive, the overall eﬀect of McDonald’s advertising campaign over the last ﬁfteen
years was to falsely promote its products as healthy, nutritious, and easily part of a balanced diet.
Next, the plaintiﬀs alleged McDonald’s falsely advertised its products as healthier than in fact by failing
to disclose the additional processing, preservatives, and additives in its products.79 As in their voluntarily
withdrawn tort claim, the plaintiﬀs alleged that McDonald’s food is unhealthier than regular hamburgers,
chicken nuggets, and French fries because of their additional processing and additives. Therefore, McDonald’s
falsely promoted its products in widespread advertising campaigns, promotions, and other statements by
implying their foods are as healthy as the unprocessed foods they resemble.80 As in their ﬁrst claim, the
plaintiﬀs asserted that had McDonald’s disclosed the processing, preservatives and additives of its products,
they would not have eaten as much and incurred their health problems.
Finally, the plaintiﬀs claimed that McDonald’s violated New York’s consumer fraud statutes “by speciﬁcally
representing to the New York State Attorney General and New York State Consumers...that it provides
nutritional brochures and information at all of stores, when in fact, such information was/is not adequately
available as represented by the Defendant to the Plaintiﬀ consumers.”81 In other words, McDonald’s violated
the consumer fraud statutes by promising to provide nutritional information in their stores and failing to
doing so. The plaintiﬀs again alleged that this failure to provide nutritional information caused them to
78Plaintiﬀs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Complaint, 2003 WL 23474949 at *13 (hereinafter “Plaintiﬀs’ Memorandum of Law”).
79Amended Complaint at *27-28.
80Id. at *13-14, *27-28.
81Id at *28-29.
35purchased more of these products than they would have otherwise.
B.
McDonald’s Defenses.
McDonald’s defended against the plaintiﬀs’ consumer fraud claims with four arguments. First, McDonald’s
argued that all the alleged misrepresentations fell outside the relevant statutes of limitations for any consumer
fraud claims. Next, it argued that the plaintiﬀs had not alleged seeing, and therefore could not have been
injured by, the supposedly deceptive ads and statements they list. In fact, McDonald’s pointed out, some
of the allegedly deceptive ads dated back to before the minor plaintiﬀs’ births. McDonald’s also asserted
that contested representations were not objectively misleading or deceptive. Likewise, they asserted that
the proper frame of reference in analyzing these representations was to view each one individually. If
the ads were each non-deceptive individually, they could not create a deceptive or misleading impression
when viewed collectively. Finally, McDonald’s characterized a large portion of these representations as non-
actionable puﬀery.82 The details and merits of these arguments are discussed below, along with the district
court’s ultimate ﬁndings.
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In its second opinion, the district court again dismissed the plaintiﬀs’ claims, this time with prejudice and
without leave to amend. Rather than discuss each of the plaintiﬀs’ claims serially, the court outlined common
deﬁciencies to all three consumer fraud counts. Furthermore, the court discussed the proximate causation
burden the plaintiﬀs bore in bringing their consumer fraud claims. Before outlining the requirements and
deﬁciencies of the plaintiﬀs’ claims, the court ﬁrst addressed how the relevant statutes of limitations aﬀected
the adult and minor plaintiﬀs.
A.
Statute of Limitations.
To begin its opinion, the court assessed whether either the adult or infant plaintiﬀs were timed barred
from bringing their statutory consumer fraud claims. In agreement with McDonald’s ﬁrst argument, the
district court noted that both §§349 and 350 had three-year statutes of limitations. Under those statutes
of limitations, the court barred all the guardian parents’ consumer fraud claims.83 The court found that
all the alleged misrepresentations were time barred because they had occurred more than three years before
the adult plaintiﬀs’ ﬁled suit. The court then held that the statute of limitations was tolled for the infant
83Pelman II. at *7.
37plaintiﬀs, and that their consumer fraud claims were admissible.84
Having eliminated all but the infant plaintiﬀs’ consumer fraud claims, the court then proceeded to analyze
which of the listed representations were actionable. This inquiry was a two-step process. First the court
analyzed whether the plaintiﬀs needed to allege seeing the representations to bring a claim under either of the
two consumer fraud statutes. After considerably narrowing the universe of representations it would consider,
the court then evaluated these remaining ads to determine whether they were objectively misleading.
B.
Which Ads Will the Court Consider: Must the Plaintiﬀs Allege Having Seen
the Deceptive Ads.
Before analyzing the merits of the plaintiﬀs’ claims, that McDonald’s falsely advertised the health content of
its products, the court discussed whether a plaintiﬀ needs to have seen a representation to bring a consumer
fraud claim based on that representation. As mentioned above, among its several defenses, McDonald’s
pointed out that many of the allegedly deceptive ads dated to a time before the infant plaintiﬀs could read
and, in some cases, before they were even born. Since the adult plaintiﬀs’ claims were eﬀectively time-
barred by the statute of limitations, whether they had seen the ads was irrelevant. McDonald’s argued,
therefore, that if the minor plaintiﬀs did not see a representation, that representation could not have caused
their injuries. McDonald’s urged the court to disregard these representations, therefore, absent any possible
cause-eﬀect relationship between that representation and the minor plaintiﬀs’ injuries.
84Id. at *6.
38In response, the plaintiﬀs asserted that McDonald’s focus on whether or not the plaintiﬀs viewed a speciﬁc
ad or statement was misguided for several reasons. First, the plaintiﬀs argued,
the dispositive question for this Court to ask is not whether Ashley Pelman or any other
named Plaintiﬀ of Class member, viewed and speciﬁcally relied on [any individual ad]. The
inquiry is whether the Plaintiﬀ’s reasonably believed the Defendants foods (hamburgers,
fries, McNuggets, ﬁsh) were healthier than-in-fact, and whether said beliefs were due to a
long-term deceptive campaign by Defendant of misrepresenting the nutritional beneﬁts of
their foods over the last approximate ﬁfteen (15) years.85
In the plaintiﬀs’ view, the issue of causation did not turn on the narrow question of whether each plaintiﬀ
saw each of the allegedly deceptive ads. Rather, the plaintiﬀs contended that all the deceptive ads, taken as
a whole, created the necessary causal relationship between McDonald’s false advertising and the plaintiﬀs’
injuries. Because of all those ads, over the last ﬁfteen years, the plaintiﬀs developed and held false ideas as
to the health value of McDonald’s products. Asking each plaintiﬀ to verify when and where they had seen
each of the more than three dozen allegedly deceptive ads would be both cumbersome and beside the point,
since it was all these ads, cumulatively, that formed the plaintiﬀs’ false opinions of McDonald’s products.86
The plaintiﬀs also asserted another interesting argument for why they did not need to allege speciﬁcally
seeing the false ads. They argued that §349 does not require that a plaintiﬀ have directly seen a defendant’s
misrepresentations to allege it caused his injuries.87 Rather, a misrepresentation made to the public at large
may give rise to a claim so long as the plaintiﬀ was part of the intended audience of that misrepresentation. To
bolster this conception of §349’s requirements, the plaintiﬀs cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §533,
86Id. at *21.
87Id. at *24. They did not, however, make the same argument for §350, which they acknowledged had a more stringent
‘reliance’ requirement.
39which states “[the] maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability... if the misrepresentation,
although not made directly to the [plaintiﬀ], is made to a third person and the maker intends or has reason to
expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other, and that it will inﬂuence
his conduct.”88
In other words, the plaintiﬀs contended that McDonald’s would still be liable to them, even if they had
not personally seen the false ads, by making the misrepresentations to the public at large. By making
those public misrepresentations, McDonald’s reasonably expected that third parties would repeat those
misrepresentations and the plaintiﬀs’ conduct would thus be inﬂuenced. Finally, the plaintiﬀs also argued
that they didn’t need to show these ads were objectively misleading. Rather, they only needed to allege
that McDonald’s engaged in a deceptive scheme and describe that scheme. In arguing as much, the plaintiﬀs
relied extensively on a California decision stating that California’s consumer fraud statute did not require
objectively misleading advertisements to base a claim.89
In sorting out these diﬀerent arguments about whether the plaintiﬀs needed to have seen the ads, the
court reached similar conclusions for both consumer fraud statutes. The court recognized that under §349,
prohibiting deceptive acts and practices, the plaintiﬀs did not need to allege ‘reliance’ on the alleged misrepre-
sentations. Whether that meant they didn’t need to allege seeing the ads as well is discussed below. To press
claims under §350, prohibiting false advertising, however, the court held that the plaintiﬀs needed to allege
having seen and having relied on the advertisements. Having thus laid out the slightly diﬀerent requirements
for §349 and §350 claims, the court then analyzed which of the plaintiﬀs’ claims survived under either statute.
88Plaintiﬀs’ Memorandum of Law at *24 (citing Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, inc, 74 Cal.App.3d 578, 581;
Committee On Children’s Television, inc. v. General Foods Corp., et al., 35 Cal. 3d 197 (1983).
89Id. (citing Committee On Children’s Television, 35 Cal. 3d 197 (1983)).
40C.
New York General Business Law §350: False Advertising.
Of the more than three dozen allegedly false statements or advertisings the plaintiﬀ listed in their Amended
Complaint and exhibits, the court found that they only alleged being aware of a single allegedly false
advertising campaign. Because they had not alleged being aware of any of the other listed ads, they could
not allege having relied on those ads and therefore, those other ads could not be the basis of a §350 claim.
As such, the court would not consider the deceptiveness of those other ads for purposes of §350. The
single instance of allegedly false advertising of which the plaintiﬀs alleged being aware were McDonald’s
announcements that it was switching to 100% vegetable oil to cook its French fries and hash browns.90
As such, the court analyzed whether the plaintiﬀs could bring a viable §350 claim based on this alleged
misrepresentation.
Ultimately the court found two problems with this even this limited §350 claim. First, the court held that
the plaintiﬀs had not suﬃciently shown that McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries.91 Second, and
speciﬁc to the 100% vegetable oil representations, the court held, as a factual matter, that McDonald’s
representations about its French fries and hash browns were not objectively misleading.92 In so holding, the
court rejected the plaintiﬀs various arguments as to why this campaign was false or misleading.
90Pelman II. at *9.
91This deﬁciency, common to the plaintiﬀs’ §349 claims as well, is more fully addressed in subsection (e) below.
92Pelman II. at *12.
411.
French Fries and Hash Brown Campaign Objectively Non-Misleading.
The plaintiﬀs alleged McDonald’s 100% vegetable oil advertising campaign was deceptive for two reasons.
First, by falsely claiming a switch to 100% vegetable oil McDonald’s falsely implied there was no cholesterol
in the fries. The plaintiﬀs argued that undisclosed beef ﬂavoring and tallow in the French fries contain some
cholesterol, and therefore the 100% vegetable oil claim was misleading. The court disagreed, however, noting
that the referenced advertisements stated that McDonald’s lowered the French fries’ cholesterol content to 9
mg, not that it had eliminated it all. Furthermore, the plaintiﬀs made no allegations that McDonald’s fries
contained any more cholesterol than that properly disclosed amount.
The plaintiﬀs made a second, more interesting argument about the deceptiveness of this advertising campaign.
The plaintiﬀs argued that the 100% vegetable oil claim falsely concealed another ingredient, which has the
eﬀect of raising consumers’ blood cholesterol levels. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀs claimed,
Defendant’s [French fries representations] are also deceptive because they are cooked and
processed with partially hydrogenated [oils], all found to signiﬁcantly increase detrimental
cholesterol, and a major contributor to coronary heart disease.93
In explaining how this constituted false advertising, the plaintiﬀs rhetorically asked, “Where is the accuracy
in advertising healthy and cholesterol-free French fries when such products are highly processed with par-
tially hydrogenated oils likely increasing heart disease?”94 The plaintiﬀs essentially argued that McDonald’s
engaged in false advertising by stating that its French fries were now lower in saturated fat and choles-
94Id.
42terol without also revealing that they are cooked in partially hydrogenated oil, which causes other health
problems. Furthermore, although McDonald’s touted the lower cholesterol content of its fries, it omitted
disclosing that partially hydrogenated oils lower a person’s ‘good cholesterol’ levels and therefore adversely
eﬀect one’s blood cholesterol levels. Without this essential disclosure, touting the French fries’ lower choles-
terol content amounted to false advertising.
The court dismissed this allegation by sharply diﬀerentiating between a food’s contents or ingredients and
its eﬀects on a person’s body. The court reasoned that McDonald’s made claims about the contents of its
French fries; it did not make any claims as to the fries’ eﬀects on a person’s cholesterol levels. Listing other
common food representations, the court stated, “[a] person can become “fat” from eating “fat-free” foods,
and a person’s blood sugar level can increase from eating “sugar-free” foods.”95 Accurately representing
a food’s nutritional content did not require further disclosure as to that food’s eﬀect on the human body.
Therefore, McDonald’s representations regarding the cholesterol levels of its French fries were objectively
non-misleading and non-actionable under §350. The court then analyzed the plaintiﬀs’ claims under New
York’s other consumer fraud statute, §349.
D.
New York General Business Law §349: Deceptive Business Practices.
In evaluating the plaintiﬀs’ §349 claims, the court again needed to decide which ads or statements it would
consider. Unlike §350, a §349 claim did not require that a plaintiﬀ allege reliance upon the contested
representation. McDonald’s argued that the plaintiﬀs’ §349 claims should still be limited to only ads the
95Pelman II. at *13.
43plaintiﬀs alleged seeing. The plaintiﬀs, in response, argued that since reliance was not a requirement for
§349, as it was under §350, they did not need to allege seeing the ads in question. The court agreed with the
plaintiﬀs that a claim under §349 did not require that they allege reliance on the contested representations.
This legal conclusion, however, did not help the plaintiﬀs because the court further noted,
[t]he absence of a reliance requirement does not, however, dispense with the need to al-
lege some kind of connection between the allegedly deceptive practice and the plaintiﬀs’
injuries...Excusing the reliance requirement only allows the plaintiﬀ to forgo the height-
ened pleading burden that is necessary for common law fraud claims. It cannot, however,
create a causal connection between a deceptive practice and a plaintiﬀ’s injury where none
has been alleged.96
In other words, while the court agreed that the plaintiﬀs did not need to plead reliance, it held they needed
to show some causal link between McDonald’s deceptive acts and their injuries. Without alleging that they
were aware of McDonald’s deceptive practices, they could not claim those practices caused their injuries. It
is worthwhile to note the subtle diﬀerences between reliance and causation requirements. Where a consumer
claims a business committed a deceptive practice (such as making a misleading statement) that injured him,
the consumer is spared the burden of proving he relied on that speciﬁc deceptive statement. He is not
required to show that absent that speciﬁc misrepresentation he would have acted otherwise. But, he must
nevertheless still show a causal link between the deceptive statement and his injury. He can show that causal
link by alleging that he heard or was aware of that deceptive statement. Once he makes that allegation, the
court will not inquire into his state of mind to decide whether he also relied on the statement he admittedly
heard.
44Applying these concepts to the case at hand, the court made the following legal determinations. The court
held that if the plaintiﬀs alleged being aware of McDonald’s misrepresentations, it would not inquire into
their states of mind, but would assume they had relied on those representations in making their consumption
choices. McDonald’s could not defend against the plaintiﬀs’ claims by arguing that the plaintiﬀs would have
nevertheless purchased its products in the absence of those misrepresentations. If, however, the plaintiﬀs were
simply unaware of McDonald’s misrepresentations at the time they incurred their injuries, McDonald’s could
fully defend against any misrepresentation claims by pointing out the absence of any causal link between
the plaintiﬀs’ injuries and its representations. This latter argument is not an argument that the plaintiﬀs
did not rely on misrepresentations of which they were aware; it is an argument that the misrepresentations
could not have caused the injury because they were unaware of them.
As such, the court still limited the plaintiﬀs’ §349 claims to the 100% vegetable oil French fries and hash
brown misrepresentations. The court ignored the other allegedly false ads because the plaintiﬀs did not allege
seeing them, and as such, there was no way those ads could have caused their injuries. In making this legal
determination, the court rejected the plaintiﬀs’ ‘cumulative eﬀect’ argument. As noted above, the plaintiﬀs
argued that all these false advertisements shaped the public’s perception of McDonald’s products and as
a result, they falsely believed these products to be healthier whether or not they saw the representations
in question.97 In this way, the plaintiﬀs argued there existed a causal relationship between the allegedly
deceptive representations and their injuries. The court however implicitly rejected the suﬃciency of this
causal link, stating, “[i]f a plaintiﬀ had never seen a particular advertisement, she could obviously not allege
that her injuries were suﬀered “as a result” of that advertisement.”98
97Plaintiﬀs’ Memorandum of Law at *24.
98Pelman II. at *10.
45E.
Proximate Causation.
Since the court concluded that none of the alleged misrepresentations it would consider were misleading, it
could have bypassed any inquiry into the plaintiﬀs’ proximate cause requirement. Nevertheless, it undertook
this inquiry and determined that the plaintiﬀs failed to carry their burden of proof. The court ﬁrst noted that
the proximate cause burden for consumer fraud claims was looser and less demanding then the comparable
standard for tort claims. In a statutory consumer fraud claim, the court stated “[c]ausation is thus more
broadly construed to carry out the state policy against fraud on consumers.”99
Applying this less demanding standard of proximate cause, the court held that the plaintiﬀs failed to draw
an adequate causal relationship between their consumption of McDonald’s products and their injuries.100
In making this ﬁnding, the court assumed, for the sake of argument, that McDonald’s French fries and
hash brown representations were misleading and that the plaintiﬀs would not have eaten as much otherwise.
Despite these assumptions, the court held that the plaintiﬀs had not adequately alleged that eating those
products proximately caused their obesity and related injuries. To meet their proximate cause burden, the
plaintiﬀs needed to do more than allege they had eaten the misrepresented products. Instead, the court laid
99Id. at *9.
100Id. at *11.
46out several interconnected issues they should have addressed, and held that without addressing these issues,
they could not adequately plead that McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries.
First, the court required that the plaintiﬀs allege they had eaten at McDonald’s with enough frequency to
raise a question of fact over whether McDonald’s could have caused their obesity. The plaintiﬀs addressed
that issue by pleading that both teenage plaintiﬀs had eaten at McDonald’s at least several times per week
over a period of years.101 Apart from that allegation, however, the plaintiﬀs failed to address other issues the
court deemed necessary to any determination that McDonald’s could have proximately caused their injuries.
Chief among those unaddressed issues was whether a number of other factors besides McDonald’s products
could have caused or signiﬁcantly contributed to their obesity. The court stated “the Complaint must address
these other variables and, if possible, eliminate them or show that a McDiet is a substantial factor despite
these other variables.”102 As listed by the court, some of these other variables included “what else did the
plaintiﬀs eat? How much did they exercise? Is there a family history of the diseases which are alleged to have
been caused by McDonald’s?”103 Without addressing these other factors, the plaintiﬀs could not adequately
allege that McDonald’s proximately caused their injuries. Since the plaintiﬀ did not address, let alone dismiss
or discount these factors, the court determined they had not adequately alleged McDonald’s proximately
caused their injuries. The court emphasized that without this additional information, McDonald’s had no
way of determining whether its products were a signiﬁcant factor in causing the plaintiﬀs’ obesity.104
The plaintiﬀs attempted to avoid these extensive pleading requirements by alleging a modiﬁed form of the
‘thin skull’ doctrine. The ‘thin skull’ doctrine is a widely accepted tort concept that states that if a defendant
101Amended Complaint at *5-8.
102Pelman II. at *10.
103Id. at *11.
104Id.
47injures a plaintiﬀ, he is liable for the full extent of the injuries he causes, even if the extent of the plaintiﬀ’s
injury is partly (or mostly) attributable to that plaintiﬀ’s unique susceptibilities. If a defendant happens
to lightly assault a plaintiﬀ with a ‘thin skull,’ he is liable for the massive injury that occurs, despite the
fact that only a lesser injury (or none at all) would occur to a normal plaintiﬀ.105 The plaintiﬀs in this
case sought to avoid questions about what else they ate, how much they exercised, their family history of
obesity and the like, by asserting that McDonald’s had to accept its consumers as they found them, even
with a ‘thin skull.’ By that, the plaintiﬀs meant that McDonald’s remains liable for a plaintiﬀ’s obesity and
other health problems, even where that plaintiﬀ is particularly susceptible to obesity or those related health
problems.
The court rejected this application of the ‘thin skull’ doctrine, noting that the doctrine is meant to make
defendants liable for the full extent of injuries they cause, not to create liability for injuries they may not
have caused. In other words, the ‘thin skull’ doctrine only comes into play where a defendant had caused
the injury, but alleges that the scope or extent of the injury caused is due to the plaintiﬀ’s particular sus-
ceptibility. In this case, however, the central issue is whether McDonald’s caused the plaintiﬀs’ injuries,
not to what extent it should be liable for injuries it caused, but whose scope it could not have foreseen.106
Rejecting this ‘thin skull’ argument, the court held that the plaintiﬀs had not adequately pled McDonald’s
proximately caused their injuries because the Amended Complaint failed to address other factors that could
have caused their obesity. Without any factual allegations discounting the eﬀect of these other factors, the
court held the plaintiﬀs inadequately alleged proximate causation.
105See generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.1988)
106Pelman II. at *12.
48F.
Pelman II: Summary of Legal Holdings.
Having thus dismissed all the plaintiﬀs’ claims for both lack of proximate cause and because the allegedly
deceptive ads were not misleading, the court then denied the plaintiﬀs leave to amend their complaint a
second time. The court noted it had already laid out the speciﬁc allegations a viable complaint would
need and refused to give the plaintiﬀs yet another chance to amend their complaint. Moreover, since the
plaintiﬀs’ complaint had two fairly large deﬁciencies, the court determined that another leave to amend
would be futile. First, the court held that the only representations that the plaintiﬀs alleged being aware
of were objectively non-misleading. The court refused to consider many other representations because the
plaintiﬀs had not alleged seeing those representations. Additionally, the court held that the plaintiﬀs failed
to adequately allege proximate causation because they did not address and discount the many other factors
that could have led to their obesity. Without addressing those other factors, they could not assert that
McDonald’s proximately caused their obesity and related health problems. After this ﬁnal dismissal, the
plaintiﬀs appealed to the Second Circuit.
49VI.
On Appeal: Appellate Briefs and the Second Circuit Ruling’s.
A.
Plaintiﬀs’ Appellate Brief.
On appeal, the plaintiﬀ-appellants highlighted ﬁve issues it asserted were wrongly decided by the district
court. Before addressing those speciﬁc points, a preliminary note is in order. Starting with the Preliminary
Statement of their Appellate Brief and throughout the brief, the plaintiﬀs pursued an interest shift in strategy.
While their earlier Complaint, Amended Complaint, and several opposition briefs and memos argued that
McDonald’s was liable for products liability, failure to warn, and several consumer fraud violations, their
Appellate Brief focused almost exclusively on a much narrower consumer fraud allegation. In fact, the
appellate-plaintiﬀs began their brief by stating,
the Appellant’s action is not based upon the products of the Defendant, but rather, is
premised upon the deceptive manner in which the Appellee marketed and advertised its
products to New York State consumers in misleading nutritional schemes.107
In their brief, the plaintiﬀs reﬁne this false advertising claim further, stating that McDonald’s violated §349
because it “chose to engage in nutritional campaigns and aﬀord nutritional advice to its consumers” and
therefore “must do so in a truthful manner.”108 Unlike earlier tort or consumer fraud-based arguments that
108Id at *13; See also at *20 (plaintiﬀs stating “because this Defendant chose to highlight supposed “pros” of its foods it
assumed the duty to advise of the “cons” of said foods).
50McDonald’s had a duty to warn of its products’ processed and unhealthy nutritional content and ingredients,
the plaintiﬀs now argued that McDonald’s assumed that duty by voluntarily deciding to advertise about its
products’ health value or ingredients. A prime example of this assumed duty, the plaintiﬀs argued, was
McDonald’s selective disclosure of its switch to vegetable oil for its French fries but its omission of material
information regarding those fries.109 The plaintiﬀs therefore presented a more narrowly crafted consumer
fraud claim on appeal then in the district court. Apart from narrowing their consumer fraud claim, they
also appealed ﬁve of the district court’s separate rulings.
1.
Reliance Requirement for §349 Claims.
To begin, the plaintiﬀs argued that the district court improperly required them to plead reliance on an ad
before considering that ad for purposes of §349. They argued that, unlike a §350 claim, a §349 claim did
not require any allegations of reliance.110 As such, the district wrongly required a showing of reliance and
improperly ignored the other allegedly deceptive ads the plaintiﬀs had listed. Rather than only consider
the 100% vegetable oil French fries representations, the district court should have considered the more than
three-dozen other representations they listed.111 The plaintiﬀs reiterated that under §349, the dispositive
question is “whether a reasonable consumer plaintiﬀ would have been misled” by a defendant’s misrepresen-
tations, not whether the plaintiﬀ actually relied on the misrepresentation.112
109Id at *27. (stating “these [French fries related] statements are misleading because they failed, while stressing illusory beneﬁts,
to advise that such fries other content: beef, hydrogenated oils and sodium likely increase the risk of [various diseases]”)
110Id at *14-16.
111Id. at *16.
112Id. at *15-16.
512.
Heightened Pleading Requirement for §349 Claims.
Next, the plaintiﬀs argued the district court improperly subjected their claims to a “heightened” pleading
standard by refusing to consider two additional potentially misleading ad campaigns. The plaintiﬀs argued
that the district court wrongly ignored the deceptiveness of two ad campaigns simply because the words
“upon information and belief” preceded their allegation that they were aware of the ads.113 As discussed
above, the district court determined that to pursue either a §349 or §350 claim, the plaintiﬀs’ needed to
allege being aware of the misrepresentations. Since the plaintiﬀs only alleged being aware of these two ad-
vertisements “upon information and belief,” the court refused to consider those ads for the plaintiﬀs’ §349
or §350 claims. The court stated that because the details of the plaintiﬀs’ awareness of McDonald’s mis-
representations were uniquely within their knowledge, allegations made upon information and belief were
insuﬃcient to support a claim under either consumer fraud statute.114 The plaintiﬀs argued that “upon
information and belief” was mere verbiage and the district court should have considered these additional
representations since the plaintiﬀs did allege seeing them.115
113Id.
114Pelman II. at *8.
115Brief for Plaintiﬀ-Appellants at *17.
523.
Heightened Pleading Requirement for Proximate Cause Allegations for §349 Claims.
Likewise, the plaintiﬀs argued that the district court imposed a “heightened” pleading standard as to their
proximate cause burden. The plaintiﬀs contended that the proximate causation standard was met by al-
leging they ate at McDonald’s with signiﬁcant frequency and would not have eaten as there as frequently
or voluminously had McDonald’s fairly represented its products. Whether their obesity and other health
problem were the result of non-McDonald’s factors (such as other restaurants or a lack of exercise) should
await full discovery and should be McDonald’s burden to prove.116 Analogizing this suit to lead poisoning,
smoking, asthma, silicosis, and asbestosis suits, the plaintiﬀs argued that once they have alleged and identi-
ﬁed the source of their injuries, it is the defendant’s burden to rebut that source by pointing to mitigating
or superceding causes.117 In any case, this inquiry into proximate cause should await fuller discovery.
4.
Economic Injury and French Fries Claims.
After listing these three signiﬁcant issues, the plaintiﬀs added two smaller objections to the district court’s
rulings. First, the plaintiﬀs argued that the district court should have addressed their “economic and statu-
tory injuries” even if they failed to meet the proximate cause standard for their “physical” injuries. By
this, the plaintiﬀs meant that even if they could not show McDonald’s caused their physical injuries, they
116Id. at *21
117Id at *22.
53had still clearly alleged that they spent money on McDonald’s products. Since McDonald’s misrepresented
those products, they were entitled to reimbursement for monies spent. As such, the district court erred in
only considering their physical injuries because the consumer fraud statutes protect consumers from strictly
economic harms as well.118 Finally, they argued that the district court’s factual ﬁnding that McDonald’s
French fries ads were objectively non-misleading was erroneous. The plaintiﬀs asserted these ads were mis-
leading for failing to disclose the fries’ beef ﬂavoring and tallow content and because they omitted material
facts about the fries, such as the use of partially hydrogenated oils.119
B.
McDonald’s Appellate Brief.
McDonald’s responded to the plaintiﬀs appeal with several counterarguments. First, McDonald’s rejected
the notion that the district court imposed any heightened pleading requirements on the plaintiﬀs. Instead
the district court required the plaintiﬀs to allege the basic elements of any consumer fraud claim, including
causation and injury. McDonald’s also emphasized that the plaintiﬀs failed to allege being aware of almost
all the alleged misrepresentations, a requirement under both §349 and §350.120 Additionally, McDonald’s
dismissed the plaintiﬀs’ argument that ads could create an overall false or misleading impression if the ads
were not deceptive in and of themselves.121 McDonald’s emphasized that the district court rightly rejected
such a view of §349 and §350 stating “[b]oth [statutes] focus on individual misrepresentations, not on amor-
118Id at *23.
119Id at *24-26.
120Brief for Defendant-Appellee at *15.
121Id at *14.
54phous schemes.”122
1.
Plaintiﬀs’ Reliance Argument Is Inapposite.
McDonald’s then countered the plaintiﬀs’ two separate causation arguments. Basically, the plaintiﬀs argued
that the district court erred on two diﬀerent causation points. First, they claimed the district court im-
properly required them to show reliance before allowing their §349 claims. By this, the plaintiﬀs mean they
should not have been required to allege that they both saw the representations and relied on them to allege
valid §349 claims. McDonald’s countered this argument by noting that, in fact, the plaintiﬀs’ §349 claims
were not rejected for failure to allege reliance, but for failure to allege awareness of the ads. Speciﬁcally,
McDonald’s argued “the District Court did not ask whether the plaintiﬀs relied on any statements or ads,
or whether they believed or were actually misled by them.”123 Rather, the district court required that the
plaintiﬀs allege being aware of the ads to show “some kind of connection between the allegedly deceptive
practice and the plaintiﬀs’ injuries.”124 Without seeing the ads, the plaintiﬀs cannot allege those ads caused
their injuries, notwithstanding the absence of any reliance requirement.
122Id.
123Id at *28.
124Pelman II. at *10.
552.
Plaintiﬀs Bear a Duty to Show Adequate Proximate Cause.
McDonald’s also addressed the plaintiﬀs’ second causation argument, regarding the district court’s proximate
causation determinations. As noted above, the plaintiﬀs argued that McDonald’s bore the burden of proving
non-McDonald’s factors caused their obesity. At the very least, they also contended that such a determination
should await a fuller discovery stage. McDonald’s responded with several counterarguments. First, it argued
that under New York law’s long-standing conception of proximate cause the plaintiﬀs were required to allege
enough information to raise a question as to whether McDonald’s was a substantial factor in their injuries.
Citing Professor Prosser and several New York decisions, McDonald’s argued that the plaintiﬀs could not
show proximate cause if their injuries might have occurred regardless of McDonald’s actions.125 Since both
the plaintiﬀs and the district court recognized that obesity is a complex, multi-factor condition, the plaintiﬀs
had to address and minimize those other factors before it could accuse McDonald’s. The plaintiﬀs shirked
that responsibility and could not appeal the district court’s dismissal given the ample warning they had
received. Furthermore, McDonald’s meticulously dissected all the diﬀerent assumptions and factors the
plaintiﬀs needed to address to connect their obesity to McDonald’s products. Succinctly, McDonald’s laid
out all those necessary steps and stated,
125Id at *20.
56McDonald’s food is only one component of any person’s diet, overall diet is only one of the
many factors that inﬂuence weight, and weight is only one of many potential risk factors
associated with some diseases. Even if a person chose to eat half her weekly meals at
McDonald’s, the many other factors within the person’s control, those left up to the parents,
and those inherent in his or her makeup play too signiﬁcant and interrelated a role in a
person’s weight and susceptibility to disease to allow a court to conclude that the food
eaten at one restaurant was the proximate cause of the person’s obesity.126
McDonald’s therefore argued that the plaintiﬀs could not, as a matter of law, show proximate cause. As
McDonald’s put it, “the waters of causation are irretrievably muddied by the multifactorial nature of obe-
sity.”127
In making these proximate cause arguments, McDonald’s also emphasized the notions of personal responsi-
bility associated with obesity. For example, McDonald’s pointed out that, unlike other injuries, obesity is
not an overnight occurrence that strikes with no warning. Unlike an ordinary tort victim, an obese person
is confronted with a series of choices everyday to combat obesity. Given each plaintiﬀ’s extensive personal
control over many of these factors, McDonald’s concluded “[t]hese are issues of personal responsibility, not
corporate liability.”128 To underscore these proximate cause arguments, McDonald’s also questioned how
the plaintiﬀs could have decide that only it was responsible for their obesity, when months before ﬁling their
Complaint in this case, they had ﬁled (but not served) a similar suit against McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Kentucky
Fried Chicken, and Burger King. 129
127Id.
128Id at *22.
129Id at *21.
573.
Economic Injury and French Fries Claims.
After devoting much of its brief to the above three issues, McDonald’s summarily countered the plaintiﬀs’
smaller contested issues on appeal. One of these ﬁnal issues was the plaintiﬀs’ argument that the district
court erroneously denied their economic or ‘out of pocket’ loss under the consumer fraud statutes, regardless
of the merits of their physical injury claims. In countering, McDonald’s stressed that one of the reasons the
district court dismissed the plaintiﬀs claims was that they had “never seen the alleged misrepresentations
at issue and therefore were not injured “by reason of” any violation of §349.”130 Without seeing the alleged
misrepresentations, they could not have incurred any injury, physical or monetary. As such, the district
court did not ignore the possibility of economic losses, but determined the plaintiﬀs had suﬀered no injury
at all, physical or economic.
Finally, McDonald’s defended against the plaintiﬀs’ appeal to reinstate the French fries and hash brown
claims. First, McDonald’s repeated the district court’s ﬁnding that the ads were not objectively misleading.
As the district court found, McDonald’s cholesterol disclosures were regulated by the FDA and were entirely
accurate and appropriate under the FDA’s regulations.131 Second, McDonald’s rejected the plaintiﬀs’ other
argument that omitting information about the trans fatty acids in McDonald’s fries was deceptive because of
the eﬀect of such trans fatty acids on a person’s blood cholesterol level. Reiterating the district court’s legal
conclusion, McDonald’s maintained that “[t]he contents of food and the eﬀects of food are entirely diﬀerent
things,” and McDonald’s made no claims as to the eﬀect of its fries on a person’s blood cholesterol levels.132
130Id at *28.
131Id at *18.
132Id.
58C.
Second Circuit Ruling.
On January 25, 2005, the Second Circuit issued an opinion reinstating some of the Pelman plaintiﬀs’
claims.133 The circuit court’s short opinion is interesting less for its explicit holdings than for the con-
tested issues it sidesteps. As evidenced from the appellate briefs, the parties vigorously contested three
general issues. First, the parties contested whether §349 required that the plaintiﬀs allege having viewed
the representations at issue. Next, the parties argued lengthily about the appropriate proximate causation
standard. What must the plaintiﬀs allege? Who bears the burden of discounting the eﬀects of other factors
on the plaintiﬀs’ obesity and other injuries? At what stage in the proceedings should these factual issues
relating to proximate cause question be litigated? Finally, the parties argued the partly factual, partly
legal question of whether McDonald’s representations about their cholesterol content of its French fries were
accurate. The essential legal question within this issue was whether McDonald’s needed to disclose the trans
fatty acids in their French fries. Demarcating the line between a food’s contents and its eﬀect on the human
body, the district court answered the above question negatively.
Before discussing the district court’s holdings, the Second Circuit outlined which of the plaintiﬀs’ claims
were on appeal. Because the plaintiﬀs had not appealed the district court’s dismissal of their §350 claims,
the Second Circuit considered any challenges to that dismissal abandoned.134 As such, the Second Circuit
considered three claims on appeal, each alleging a cause of action under §349. Those claims were as follows:
Count I alleged that “the combined eﬀect of McDonald’s various promotional representations...was to cre-
ate the false impression that its food products were nutritionally beneﬁcial and part of a healthy lifestyle if
133Pelman v. McDonald’s 396 F. 3d 508 (2nd Cir. 2005) (hereinafter “Pelman III.”)
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59consumed daily.”135 Count II alleged McDonald’s failed to disclose its use of additives and how it processes
its products. Count III alleged that McDonald’s falsely promoted the availability of nutritional information
in its store when such information was not readily available.136
1.
Appropriate Pleading Standard for §349 Claims.
After listing these three claims, the Second Circuit laid out the pleading standard for §349 claims. The
circuit court held that since a §349 claim does not require proof of the same elements as a common-law fraud
claim, it has a lower pleading standard. Speciﬁcally, while a common-law fraud claim is subject to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b)’s pleading-with-particularity requirements, a §349 claim need only meet
the bare-bones notice-pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).137 Under that less demanding pleading standard,
the Second Circuit held that information about the rest of the plaintiﬀs’ diet, exercise habits, family history
of obesity and the like,
135Id. at 510.
136Id.
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60is the sort of information that is appropriately the subject of discovery, rather than what is
required to satisfy the limited pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)...This simpliﬁed notice
pleading standard [of Rule 8(a)] relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to deﬁne disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims...So far
as the §349 claims are concerned, the amended complaint more than meets the requirements
of Rule 8(a).138 (internal citations omitted)
Holding that §349 claims only require a bare-bones notice-pleading standard under Rule 8(a), the Second
Circuit determined that the plaintiﬀs’ Amended Complaint met that standard. According to the Second
Circuit, the plaintiﬀs’ Amended Complaint alleged the following: (1) McDonald’s misrepresented its prod-
ucts’ health value and the plaintiﬀs were led to believe those products were healthier than in fact, (2) the
plaintiﬀs ate at McDonald’s with signiﬁcant weekly frequency, and (3) as a result, they suﬀered obesity
and other injuries.139 The circuit court held that such allegations met the simple pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a). The Second Circuit concluded, therefore, that the factual issues surrounding the proximate cause
determination should be examined at a later stage. This ruling is the exclusive basis for vacating the district
court’s dismissal of the §349 claims.
139Id. at 510.
612.
Unaddressed Questions in the Second Circuit’s Ruling.
Interestingly, the Second Circuit never addressed the district court’s second grounds for dismissing the §349
claims; that the plaintiﬀs only saw one representation (the French fries campaign), and that this represen-
tation was objectively non-misleading. The district court did not consider the other allegedly deceptive
ads because the plaintiﬀs failed to allege ever seeing them.140 The Second Circuit, however, avoided any
discussion of that district court holding. Instead, in a ﬁnal footnote to its opinion, the Second Circuit wrote,
[a]s for the district court’s ﬁnding that McDonald’s representations regarding its French
fries and hash browns were objectively non-misleading, the §349 claims are not subject to
dismissal on that basis given that the amended complaint alleges the deceptiveness of many
other representations.141
The district court, however, never addressed those other representations because it ruled they were immate-
rial, since the plaintiﬀs did not allege ever seeing them.
The Second Circuit indirectly addressed this seeming conﬂict in another ruling. In this same footnote,
the Second Circuit stated that the plaintiﬀs should be given a chance to cure deﬁciencies in their §349
allegations. As noted above, the parties contested whether McDonald’s could be liable under §349 for a
long-term scheme to misrepresent its products, even if individual representations did not arise to level of
deceptiveness. The district court sided with McDonald’s, holding that consumer fraud allegations under
either provision must point to speciﬁc deceptive representations, and an amorphous long-term deceptive
140Pelman II. at *10.
62scheme is not actionable absent speciﬁc deceptive representations.142 Unlike California’s consumer fraud
statute, New York’s consumer fraud statute utilized an objective standard of deceptiveness, requiring the
plaintiﬀs to list speciﬁc, deceptive representations.143 The district court therefore refused to consider whether
the general impression created by individually non-deceptive ads was nevertheless deceptive. In reviewing
this district court ruling, the Second Circuit stated the following:
[a]lthough the district court also dismissed the §349 claims on the ground that plaintiﬀs’
allegations of a generalized campaign to create a false impression were vague and conclu-
sory (citations omitted), the cure for such deﬁciencies, in a claim not required to be plead
with particularity, is a motion for a more deﬁnite statement under Rule 12(e), rather than
dismissal.144
In other words, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiﬀs could not allege a “generalized campaign to create
a false impression,” but held that, under the bare-bones pleading standard, such deﬁciency should be cured
rather than dismissing the Complaint. Since the Second Circuit allowed the plaintiﬀs to cure their Complaint
of one deﬁciency, it seems likely the Second Circuit anticipates that the plaintiﬀs will also properly allege
seeing any representations they contest. Once the plaintiﬀs are given leave to cure one deﬁciency, they can
also cure another deﬁciency: failing to allege seeing contested representations.
This conclusion is buttressed by the Second Circuit’s ruling regarding the 100% vegetable oil French fries
representations. The Second Circuit does not overrule the district court’s determination that the French fries
and hash brown representations were objectively non-misleading. That plaintiﬀs’ appellate claim is rejected.
As such, the Second Circuit implicitly allows the plaintiﬀs to amend their Complaint to allege seeing the
142Pelman I. at 527.
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63other representations at issue. If the plaintiﬀs do not allege seeing those representations, the district court
will again dismiss their Complaint. As the district court held in its second opinion – a ruling the Second
Circuit leaves undisturbed – the plaintiﬀs cannot bring a §349 claim if they have not seen the representation
at issue.145
3.
Pelman Future Complaint.
Given the Second Circuit’s rulings, the plaintiﬀs’ next complaint can be expected to have at least the
following features. First, the plaintiﬀs will allege seeing any of the representations they claim are deceptive.
Therefore, rather than simply listing dozens of alleged misrepresentations over the last ﬁfteen years, only
representations which the minor plaintiﬀs were aware of will be listed. To adequately allege being aware
of these representations, the plaintiﬀs do not need to specify exactly when they saw each representation,
rather they need only “allege in general terms that [they] were aware of the false advertisement.”146 This
requirement will clearly shorten the list of representations that allegedly violate Section 349. For example,
the New York Attorney General letters in which McDonald’s agrees to provide nutritional information at
its stores will be excluded, given the near certainty that the minor plaintiﬀs were not aware of those letters.
Likewise, representations that predate a time before the minors could read will also be excluded. Additionally,
any representations made in a medium or geographical area inaccessible to the minor plaintiﬀs, such as on
the internet or in a foreign country, will also be excluded.
145Pelman II. at *10.
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64Moreover, the Pelman Complaint will also ignore the additional proximate cause factors the district court
had originally required. Because of the Second Circuit’s ruling that they need only meet a bare-bones
pleading standard, the plaintiﬀs will postpone any proximate cause determinations to later discovery stages.
Since the Second Circuit did not rule that such a fact-speciﬁc proximate cause determination is unnecessary,
however, the plaintiﬀs will need to meet this proximate cause standard at a later stage. Finally, since the
plaintiﬀs’ waived any arguments to the dismissal of their §350 claims or the dismissal of the adult plaintiﬀs,
those claims will be barred. As such, the plaintiﬀs’ Complaint will only pursue a §349 cause of action for
the minor plaintiﬀs, based only on the much number of representations they minors have seen.
VII.
Evolution (Diminution) of Plaintiﬀs’ Claims.
The Pelman plaintiﬀs, currently in front of the Southern District of New York for the third time, are now
alleging a much more modest claim than they did in their original Complaint. Because they were pursuing
a novel lawsuit, the Pelman’s initial Complaint alleged a wide variety of common-law tort and statutory
consumer fraud claims. Moreover, both the consumer fraud and tort claims alleged that McDonald’s misrep-
resented its products aﬃrmatively, by omission, and by creating an amorphous, long-term misconception of
the healthiness of its food. Additionally, the tort claims were premised on several theories including products
liability, failure to warn of latent defects, inherently dangerous product doctrine , food allergy doctrine, and
an interesting food alteration / processing argument. Moreover, both the adult and minor plaintiﬀs pressed
all these claims.
65In contrast, the plaintiﬀs are currently pursuing only their consumer fraud claims. Since these are the only
claims now being alleged, the adult plaintiﬀs have been dismissed entirely from this suit because their con-
sumer fraud statutes of limitations have elapsed.147 In abandoning all their tort claims, however, the Pelman
plaintiﬀs lost more than just the presence of adult plaintiﬀs. Rather, they abandoned one of the claims that
the district court considered promising and which could have provided the necessary duty to warn customers
for McDonald’s. This abandoned claim was that McDonald’s processed its foods to such an extent as to
create a more dangerous product or latent dangers and that McDonald’s had an ensuing duty to warn its
consumers of this more dangerous product.
A.
Abandoned Tort Claim Revisited.
Unlike the other tort claims, which failed because liability could not attach where a product’s dangers were
common knowledge, this food alteration claim pointed to a latent danger that was not within the public’s
common knowledge (i.e., that McDonald’s processing rendered its products substantially less healthy than
similar unprocessed foods).148 The plaintiﬀs, however, abandoned this claim, presumably for two reasons.
First, since this was a tort, not a consumer fraud claim, they faced a higher proximate cause standard. The
plaintiﬀs sought to avoid an inquiry into their eating habits, family history of obesity and the like, by only
alleging consumer fraud violations, which they claimed didn’t require such inquiries to satisfy its proximate
cause standard. Second, the plaintiﬀs still pursued this food alteration argument by co-opting it as an
147Pelman II. at *7.
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66additional premise for why McDonald’s violated the consumer fraud statute. In other words, rather than
pursue this claim as a stand alone tort, they alleged that McDonald’s excessive processing or ‘alteration’ of
its foods was another reason McDonald’s violated the consumer fraud statutes.
For the plaintiﬀs to premise a consumer fraud claim on this food alteration argument, however, they will
need to point to speciﬁc statements in which McDonald’s represents that their foods are less processed
than in reality. In fact, the plaintiﬀs oﬀered several such representations in their Amended Complaint and
opposition papers. For example, the plaintiﬀs cited ads in which McDonald’s claimed, “We cook the way you
do at home,” “Good, basic nutritious food.” and “Food that’s been the foundation of well-balanced diets for
generations.”149 To base a §349 claim on these statements, however, they must be objectively misleading and
not mere ‘product puﬀery.’150 While the district court has yet to decide whether these particular statements
are objectively misleading, it has already dismissed similar generalities by McDonald’s as mere puﬀery and
it seems likely that the above statements will likewise be dismissed as non-misleading product puﬀery.
As such, it appears that the plaintiﬀs’ arguments that McDonald’s misrepresented its overly processed prod-
ucts will not be a viable §349 claim. Had they pursued this argument in a tort claim, the mere absence of
any information about these ‘overly-processed’ foods may have led to liability. By presenting this argument
exclusively as a consumer fraud claim, however, the plaintiﬀs must now point to aﬃrmative representations
by McDonald’s that misleads consumers about the processing and alteration of its products. Absent any such
representations, silence about its processed foods will not expose McDonald’s to consumer fraud liability. To
date, the plaintiﬀs have failed to point to any such representations except for the general puﬀery statements
listed above.
149See e.g., Amended Complaint at *12-13, Brief for Plaintiﬀ-Appellants at *7, and Plaintiﬀs’ Reply Memo at *4.
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67B.
Plaintiﬀs’ Burdens In Pursuing Their Consumer Fraud Claims.
The above discussion of the plaintiﬀs’ abandoned tort claim highlights a strategic choice the plaintiﬀs made
in pursuing their claims against McDonald’s. To avoid the higher proximate cause requirement of tort claims,
the plaintiﬀs voluntarily abandoned those claims and only followed up on their consumer fraud claims. While
consumer protection claims may require a lesser proximate cause showing, they too have weighty require-
ments. As evidenced by the district court’s treatment of the plaintiﬀs’ consumer fraud claims, the plaintiﬀs
will need to overcome several obstacles to state a viable consumer fraud claim. First, only ads they can allege
having seen or being aware of will be considered for consumer fraud purposes.151 Next, the plaintiﬀs will
need to show that McDonald’s ads were objectively misleading. As shown from the district court’s treatment
of French fries and hash brown claims, simply pointing to some material information omitted from an ad is
not enough to create a §349 claim unless the omitted information renders the ad misleading. Finally, since
the court rejected the plaintiﬀs’ theory about a generalized campaign to create a false impression, they will
have to point to speciﬁc ads and explain why those ads are misleading. The plaintiﬀs cannot state a claim
based on the overall misimpression consumers get from McDonald’s ads, if none of the ads are misleading
themselves.
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68C.
Conclusion.
Ultimately, this lawsuit was premised on a simple notion: McDonald’s bore some kind of liability for selling
products that contributed to the plaintiﬀs’ obesity and health problems. The possible sources or reasons
for such liability were less clear and the original Complaint laid out several common law tort and statutory
consumer fraud theories. After the district court’s ﬁrst decision, the plaintiﬀs’ opted to pursue only their
consumer fraud claims, presumably because the tort claims required diﬃcult proximate cause and duty
showings. While these consumer fraud claims require a lesser proximate cause showing, they present their
own set of diﬃculties.
First, the plaintiﬀs must point to speciﬁc, individual misrepresentations. The district court rejected the
plaintiﬀs’ theory that consumer fraud liability could attach based on a “generalized campaign to create a
false impression” even if individual ads were not misleading.152 Additionally, the district court made clear
that an ad is not misleading if it relates to a food’s content or ingredients but omits information about the
product’s eﬀect on a person’s body. If a representation is solely about a food’s content or ingredients, it
will not be deemed misleading because it omits information about that food’s eﬀect on the human body.153
Third, the plaintiﬀs can only base their consumer fraud allegations on representations they personally saw or
were aware of. Older representations, representations made in foreign countries, or nonpublic materials (such
as state attorney general settlement letters) are unlikely to have reached the minor plaintiﬀs and cannot be
the basis of a §349 consumer fraud claim. Finally, despite the Second Circuit’s ruling, the plaintiﬀs will still
152Pelman I. at 528 (court stating “[b]ecause such statements are necessarily ’consumer-oriented’ and thus in the public domain,
plaintiﬀs should be able...to point to the speciﬁc statements that form the basis of their claims pursuant to §§ 349 and 350”)
153See Section V.(C)(1) above regarding the 100% vegetable oil French fries representations.
69have to show that McDonald’s misrepresentations proximately caused their injuries. While they do not need
to make this showing at the pleading stage, the district court held that the plaintiﬀs ultimately bore this
burden of proof, and the Second Circuit did not overrule that holding. Before the plaintiﬀs can recover any
award, therefore, they will need to answer the same fact-speciﬁc questions the district court laid out in its
second opinion.154
These hurdles make it unlikely that the plaintiﬀs can state a viable claim before the district court on this
third visit. Given the dearth of objectively misleading representations, as that term has been deﬁned by the
district court, and the additional requirement that the minors have viewed these representations, it seems
their Complaint will be dismissed again. Interestingly, despite this likely dismissal, it appears much of the
plaintiﬀs’ desired remedies have already been fulﬁlled. Indeed, the plaintiﬀs argued as much before the
district court in asking for attorney’s fees and monetary damages. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀs noted,
the Defendant has made substantial changes to its products and cooking oils, com-
pletely modiﬁed its website with nutritional tools and information, now oﬀers local
educational programs on obesity, instituted fruits/vegetables yogurts, McVeggie Burger,
vegetables and Premium Salads on its menus, and actually changed the composition
of its Chicken McNuggets to New York state consumers, all in the last seven months.
In essence, the Defendant has constructively settled this case by aﬀording all equitable and remedial remedies requested by the Plaintiﬀs.155
(underscore added)
Given these changes by McDonald’s, which the plaintiﬀs attribute to their lawsuit, they have achieved many
of their desired reforms despite the little success they had in the courtroom to date. Ultimately, then, while
154See Section V.(E) above.
70the plaintiﬀs could not overcome the diﬀerent legal barriers to recovery for either their consumer fraud or
tort claims, they may have succeeded in achieving their larger litigation objectives.
71